This paper studies methodologically robust options for giving logical contents to nodes in abstract argumentation networks. It defines a variety of notions of attack in terms of the logical contents of the nodes in a network. General properties of logics are refined both in the object level and in the metalevel to suit the needs of the application. The network-based system improves upon some of the attempts in the literature to define attacks in terms of defeasible proofs, the so-called rulebased systems. We also provide a number of examples and consider a rigorous case study, which indicate that our system does not suffer from anomalies. We define consequence relations based on a notion of defeat, consider rationality postulates, and prove that one such consequence relation is consistent.
Introduction
An abstract argumentation network has the form (S , R), where S is a nonempty set of arguments and R ⊆ S × S is an attack relation. When (x, y) ∈ R, we say x attacks y.
The elements of S are atomic arguments and the model does not give any information on what structure they have and how they manage to attack each other.
The abstract theory is concerned with extracting information from the network in the form of a set of arguments which are winning (or 'in'), a set of arguments which are defeated (or are 'out') and the rest are undecided. There are several possibilities for such sets and they are systematically studied and classified. See Figure 1 for a typical situation. x → y in the figure represents (x, y) ∈ R.
A good way to see what is going on is to consider a Caminada labelling. This is a function λ on S distributing values λ(x), x ∈ S in the set {in, out, ?} satisfying the following conditions. Such λ exist whenever S is finite and for any such λ, the set S + λ = {x | λ(x) = 1} is the set of winning arguments, S − λ = {x | λ(x) = 0} is the set of defeated arguments and S ? λ = {x | λ(x) =?} is the set of undecided arguments.
The features of this abstract model are as follows:
1. Arguments are atomic, have no structure.
2. Attacks are stipulated by the relation R; we have no information on how and why they occur.
3. Arguments are either 'in' in which case all their attacks are active or are 'out' in which case all their attacks are inactive. There is no in between state (partially active, can do some attacks, etc.). Arguments can be undecided.
4. Attacks have a single strength, no degrees of strength or degree of transmission of attack along the arrow, etc.
5. There are no counter attacks, no defensive actions allowed or any other responses or counter measures.
6. The attacks from x are uniform on all y such that (x, y) ∈ R. There are no directional attacks or coordinated attacks. 1 In Figure 1 , a 1 , . . . , a n attack b individually and not in coordination. For example, a 1 does not attack b with a view of stopping b from attacking e 1 but without regard to e 1 , . . . , e n . 1 There is some controversy on whether arguments accrue. While Pollock denies the existence of cumulative argumentation [15] , Verheij defends that arguments can be combined either by subordination or by coordination, and may accrue in stages [16] . The debate is by no means over or out of date, see e.g. also [13] . Relatedly, in neural networks, the accrual of arguments by coordination appears to be a natural property of the network models [6] . The accrual of arguments can also be learned naturally by argumentation neural networks. 7 . The view of the network is static. We have a graph here and a relation R on it.
So Figure 1 is static. We use the words 'there is no progression in the network' to indicate this; the network is static. We seek a λ labelling on it and we may find several. In the case of Figure 1 there is only one such λ. λ(a i ) = 1, λ(b) = 0, λ(e j ) = 1, i, j = 1, . . . , n.
We advocate a dynamic view, like first a i attack b and b then (if it is not out dead) tries to attack e i . Or better still, at the same time each node launches an attack on whoever it can. So a i attack b and b attacks e i and the result is that a i are alive (not being attacked) while b and e j are all dead.
Points 4 and 7 above have been addressed in [2] , and points 6 and 7 in [6] , but points 1-3 and 5 remain untreated by us. It is our aim in this paper to give theoretical answers to these questions.
There are several authors who have already addressed some of these questions. See [3; 4] . We shall build upon their work, especially [4] .
Obviously, to answer the above questions we must give contents to the nodes. We can do this in two ways. We can do this in the metalevel, by putting predicates and labels on the nodes and by writing axioms about them or we can do it in the object level, giving internal structure to the atomic arguments and/or saying what they are and defining the other concepts, e.g. the notion of attack in terms of the contents. Figure 2 is an example of a metalevel extension. The node a is labelled by α. It attacks the node b with transmission factor ε. This transmission factor is an important feature of our approach. In fact, it will prove crucial in answering some of the questions. The idea stems from our research on neural-symbolic computation [8] [7] . It can be associated with the above-mentioned learning process, where an agent identifies the changes that are required in the system. This concept turns out to be quite general and yet useful in a computational setting. In the case of a recurrent network, for example, attacks on arrows can be used to control infinite loops, as discussed in [2] and exemplified through the use of learning algorithms in [6] . In other words, we see loops as a trigger for learning.
Example 1.1 (Metalevel connects to nodes)
Formally, we have a set S of nodes, here
The relation R is more complex. It has the usual arrows {(a, b), (b, c)} ⊆ R and also the double arrows, namely,
We have a labelling function l, giving values
We can generalise the Caminada labelling as a function from S ∪ R to some values which satisfy some conditions involving the labels. We can write axioms about the labels in some logical language and these axioms will give more meaning to the argumentation network. See [2] for some details along these lines. The appropriate language and logic to do this is Labelled Deductive Systems (LDS) [9] .
We shall not pursue the metalevel extensions approach in this paper except for one well known construction which will prove useful to us later. In [14] , a neural network is used as a computational model for conditional logic, in which attacks on arrows are allowed. More precisely, these are graphs where arcs are allowed to connect not only nodes, but nodes to arcs, denoting an exception that can change a default assumption. For example, suppose that node a is connected to node b, indicating that a normally implies b. A node c can be connected to the connection from a to b, indicating that c is an exception to the rule. In other words, if c is activated, it blocks the activation of b, regardless of the activation of a. In logic programming terms, we would have a ∧ ¬c ⇒ b. Leitgeb's networks can be reduced to networks containing no arcs connected to arcs; these are the CILP networks used in [5] to compute and learn logic programming. Here, the networks are more general. There are three cases to consider:
1. The fact that a node a attacks a node b can attack a node c, (a → b) → c; 2. A node a can attack the attack of a node b on a node c, a → (b → c); and 3. The fact that node a attacks node b attacks the attack from node c to node
Here, there are cases that cannot be reduced or flattened. The most general network set-up allowing for connections to connections is the fibring set-up of [7] , where it is proved that fibred networks are strictly more expressive than their flattened counterpart, CILP networks. In [7] , nodes in one network (or part of a network) are allowed to change dynamically the weights (or transmission factors) of connections in another network. This can be seen as an integration of learning (the progressive change of weights) into the reasoning system (the network computation). It provides a rich connectionist model towards a unifying theory of logic and network reasoning.
We are now ready for our second approach, namely giving logical content to nodes. Assume we are using a certain logic L. L can be monotonic, nonmonotonic, algorithmic, etc. At this stage anything will do. This logic has the notion of formulas A of the logic, theories ∆ of the logic and the notion of ∆ ⊢ A, and possibly also the notion of ∆ is not consistent.
The simplest approach is to assume the nodes x ∈ S are theories ∆ x supporting logically a formula A x (i.e. ∆ x ⊢ A x in the logic). The exact nature of the nodes will determine our options for defining attacks of one node on another.
We list the important parameters. 
Attacks can be combined.
3. The target may be crippled but can still 'regroup' and attack some of its own targets.
The nature of any attack is based on inconsistency and revision.
5. We can sequence the attacks as a progression along the relation R.
Attacks are not symmetrical since we use revision. So if A attacks ∼ A, AGM revision [1], for example, will give preference to A. So for ∼ A to attack A it has
to do so explicitly, and the winner is determined by the progression of the attack sequence. 
2
So if node x = (∆ x , A x ) attacks node y, it simply adds ∆ x to ∆ y and we get y
Here the attack is based on providing more information and not on inconsistency and revision.
To show the difference, let ∆ y be:
2 A nonmonotonic consequence on the wffs of the logic satisfies three minimal properties
2. Restricted monotonicity: ∆| ∼A and ∆| ∼B imply ∆, A| ∼B.
3. Cut Rule: ∆, A| ∼B and ∆| ∼A imply ∆| ∼B.
Note that | ∼ can be presented in many ways, semantically, proof theoretically or algorithmically.
Bird (a)
where → is defeasible implication. Let A y be Fly (a).
Let ∆ x and A x be Penguin (a). x can attack y by sending it the extra information that Penguin (a). Another attack from another point x ′ to y can be by sending ∼ Bird(a) to y, i.e. ∆ x ′ = A x ′ =∼ Bird (a). [6] .
Example 1.7 (Counter-attack) The Dung framework does not allow for counterattacks being effective only when attacked but not before. The model is static. The attacks do not 'progress' along the network like a flow going through the nodes activating them as it goes along. However, if we perceive such progression, we can define the concept of counter-attack. This is the same progression that may resolve syntactic loops in
Consider Figure 6 . Figure 7 .
∆ e n Figure 7 :
We may have
and therefore the attack on e 1 fails, but we may still have that ∆ a + β| ∼α n , hence the attack on e n still succeeds. The attack by β is not a specific attack on the arrow from a to e 1 . It tansforms a to something else which does not attack e 1 . So Figure 7 is not a good representation of it. It shows the result but not the meaning.
By the way, to attack the attack from x to a in Figure 7 , we might add a formula β ′ to β, and so the attack changes from β to (β and β ′ ). 
Methodological considerations
In order to present a methodologically robust view of logical modes of attack in argumentation networks, as intutiively described in the last section, we need to clarify some concepts. There is logical tension between two possibly incompatible themes.
Theme 1
Start with a general logical consequence | ∼, use databases of this logic as nodes in a network and define the notion of attack and then emerge with one or more admissible extensions.
Questions
These extensions are sets of nodes (the 'winning' nodes or the network 'output' nodes). They contain logic in them, being themselves theories of our background logic. What are we going to expect from them? Consistency? Are we going to define a new logic from the process?
Theme 2
We start with some notion of proof (argument). We can prove opposing formulas or databases of some language L. We create a network of all the proofs we are interested in and define the notion of one proof (argument) attacking another. We emerge with several admissible or winning sets of proofs.
Questions
What are we to do with these proofs? Do we define a logical consequence relation using them? For example, let ∆ be a set of formulas and rules. Let S be all possible proofs we can build up using ∆. Note that these proofs can prove opposing results, e.g. q and ∼ q, etc. So we do not yet have a consequence relation for getting results out of ∆. Let R be a notion of attack we define on S . Let E be a winning extension chosen in some agreed manner. Then we define a new consequence by declaring ∆| ∼E.
What connection do we require between this new consequence | ∼ and some other possibly reasonable consequence relation we can define directly using proofs (without the intermediary of networks)? We need rationality postulates on the notion of defeat.
To make the above questions precise and gain some intuitions towards their solutions we need to examine some examples in rigorous detail. We begin with some puzzles critically examined in [4] . We now discuss this example. First let us try to sort out some confusion. Are we working in Theme 1, where there is a background logic or in Theme 2 where we want to use an argumentation framework to define a logic?
If there is a background logic then does it inlcude closure under strict rules? If yes, then A 3 and A 4 already attack each other. If no, then don't worry about the inconsistency of the output. We simply have defined an inconsistent theory using the tool of argumentation networks.
Caminada and Amgoud are aware that if we allow closure under strict rules at every stage then the anomaly is resolved. They attribute this solution to Prakken and Sartor [17] . They offer another example, which has anomaly, example 6, page 293, and where this trick does not work. We shall address this example later. Let us first consider Caminada and Amgoud's own solution to Example 4. They add two more contraposition rules to the database.
With two more rules in the database, two more arguments can be constructed from the database:
Now that our stock of arguments has A7 and A8, we have that A8 defeats A3 and A7 defeats A4. The set of winning arguments changes and the only justified arguments are {wr, go}, without the anomalies {b, m}.
We do not consider this as a solution to the anomaly. Caminada and Amgoud changed the problem (i.e. took a different, bigger database) and changed the underlying logic. Not always do we have that if x → y is a rule so is ∼ y →∼ x. We need to give a rigorous definition of the defeasible logic we are using, and then examine the problem of anomalies. We shall do this in Section 3. See Example 3.9 and Remark 3.12. The anomalies arise because the Dung framework does not allow for joint attacks. By the way, Caminada and Amgoud have done an excellent analysis of the anomalies. We are simply continuing their initial work.
Let 
A fact has the form ±a (we consider strict facts only; an alternative would be to consider beliefs, and yet another to consider degrees of belief).

A database ∆ is a set of rules (strict or defeasible) and facts.
Definition 2.4 Let ∆ be a database. We define the notion of the sequence π of formulas (actually a tree of formulas written as a sequence) is an argument for the literal ±a of length n and defeasible degree m, and specificity σ.
π is an argument of ±a from ∆ of length 1 and degree 0 iff ±a ∈ ∆ and π = (±a).
Let σ = {±a}. Step 1 We also agree that if ∆| ∼ m ± a i and ±a i → ±a ∈ ∆ then ∆| ∼ m ± a. We say ∆| ∼ ± a if ∆| ∼ m ± a for some m.
Assume
∆| ∼ 1 ± a iff ±a ∈ ∆ Step m + 1 ∆| ∼ m+1 ± a iff
Remark 2.7 The previous definition is one possibility of many. The important point to note is that any definition of | ∼ must say inside the induction step how one argument defeats another.
Let us give some examples.
Example 2.8
We have that ∆ | 2 c because the argument a, a We are now ready for some methodological comments.
Rationality postulates for defeat
We need rationality postulates on the notion D of one argument defeating another where the arguments are defined in the context of facts, strict rules and defeasible rules. Caminada and Amgoud give rationality postulates on the admissible sets derived from D but this is insufficient. D must be such that it ensures we get a proper consequence relation | ∼ D out of it, satisfying reflexivity, restricted monotonicity and cut.
Representation problem
1. Given a consequence relation | ∼ for defeasible logic (i.e. | ∼ contains defeasible and strict rules), can we extract from | ∼ a defeat notion D = D | ∼ for arguments, and a network algorithm A such that the notion | ∼ D,A is a subset of | ∼?
2. Given any consequence relation defined by any means (e.g. defined semantically), can we guess/invent a notion of argument and a notion of defeat D such that the associated | ∼ D,A is a subset of | ∼?
3. If we don't have such a representation theorem in the case of (1) above, using a natural D | ∼ , then we perceive this as an anomaly.
Any solution to the anomalies raised in [4] must respect the above methodologial observations. It must not be an ad hoc solution.
A rigorous case study -1
This section shows in a rigorous way how Theme 2 works. We define a nonmonotonic consequence relation using networks on arguments built up using rules.
Two comments
1. The strict rules need not be classical logic.
2. We use labelling to keep control of the proof process and possibly add strength to rules. However, the labels will not be used at first in our definitions and examples.
Some strict logics require the labels in their formulation (e.g. resource logics) as well.
Definition 3.1
1. Let our language contain atomic statements Q = {p, q, r, . . .}, the connective ∼ for negation, ∧ for conjunction, → for strict rules and ⇒ for defeasible rules.
A literal x is either an atom q or ∼ q. We write −x to mean ∼ q if x = q and q if x =∼ q.
A rule has the form (x 1 , . . . , 
Definition 3.2 (Arguments) We define the notion of an argument (or proof) π (based on a database ∆) its ∆-output θ ∆ (π), its head H(π) , its literal base L(π), and its family of subarguments A(π).
Any literal t : x ∈ ∆ is an argument of level Its head is t : x. Its ∆-output is the set of all literals in the strict closure of {t : x} and its head rule H(∆) is t : x.
Its literal base is {t : x} and its subarguments are ∅. 
3. An argument is consistent if its output is consistent. (2) 
Let
π 1 = (t 1 : x ′ 1 , . . . , t n : x ′ n , r : (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ⇒ x) π 2 = (s 1 : y ′ i , . . . ,
In
The arguments 1. Consider the two arguments 
Consider now π
So π 3 defeats π 2 according to this section (as opposed to Definition 2.6).
Example 3.6 (Cut rule) Again we do not use labels, and we do not care about order in the antecedents of rules.
Let ∆ be
We have ∆, a| ∼c
Because of the proof
This is because of π 3 .
We ask do we have ∆| ∼c? We can substitute the proof of a into the proof of c, that is we substitute π 3 into π 1 . We get π 4 .
The question is, can we defeat π 4 ? We can get a proof of ∼ c by substituting
We define this by induction on m. We know from item (4) 
The arguments are, besides the literals a, b, c, the following: 
The argument η 0 is inconsistent, and we ignore arguments like
Since attacks and defeats are done by the output of the arguments, we get that η i attacks and is being attacked by π i .
The resulting network will need a Caminada labelling and not all π i , η i will always be winning.
The outputs of the various arguments are as follows: Figure 8 shows the network (we ignore the arguments which give nothing new). Clearly, any Caminada labelling will choose one of the pairs {η i , π i }. The justified theory will be consistent! 
Then we define
∆| ∼a iff a ∈ Q ∆ .
Lemma 3.11 Q is consistent.
Proof. Otherwise we have several winning arguments. π i , i = 1, . . . , n with x i ∈ θ ∆ (π i ) such that ∆ S and {x i } and the strict rules in ∆ can prove y and ∼ y. Assume n is minimal for giving a contradiction. However, the argument We also have the atomic arguments (a), (u) and (x). We have ∆| ∼a because of π a and maybe ∆, a| ∼b because of π b , but this is attacked and defeated by B 1 . We now look at π a b and ask whether it is undefeated and hence shows that ∆| ∼b. It is attacked by η and defeated.
Conclusion
We have proposed methodologically robust options for giving logical contents to nodes in abstract argumentation networks. We have provided a number of examples and considered a rigorous case study. We have also defined consequence relations based on a notion of defeat, considered rationality postulates, and proved that one such consequence relation is consistent. As future work we shall investigate the issue of network computation in connection with the general methodology of fibring, and the question of learning and adapting the network system further to new information and evolving scenarios so that statistical aspects of the data can also be taken into account by the logic. Our objective is to provide a unified theory of logic and network reasoning, from unifying principles to computational systems and applications. Along with [18] and [8] , this paper is a step in this direction.
